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Examining the utility of social control and social learning in the radicalization of violent and non-violent extremists

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ABSTRACT

Research on radicalization to accept extremist ideologies has expanded dramatically over the last decade, particularly attempts to theorize pathways to violence. These models are complex, and contain aspects of key criminological frameworks including social learning and social control theories. At the same time, they do reconcile the inherent differences in these frameworks, requiring research to examine how these models could be combined and the utility in using an integrated model to account for radicalization as a whole. This analysis uses four case studies developed from two of the most well-known open-source terrorism databases to assess these frameworks, using two far-right and two jihadist perpetrators, with one engaged in violence and the other non-violent activity in each ideological grouping. The implications of this analysis for our understanding of radicalization and the utility of criminological theories are considered in depth.

Scholarly efforts to better understand terrorism have greatly increased since the attacks on September 11th, 2001, particularly using criminological perspectives (Forest et al., 2011; Freilich et al., 2014; Freilich et al., 2015; Hamm, 2007; LaFree & Bersani, 2014; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree et al., 2015; Smith & Damphousse, 2009). Researchers have begun empirically assessing both the foreground and situational dynamics that lead individuals to engage in ideologically motivated violence Hamm, 2007; Hsu & Apel, 2015). Key strides have been made to identify pathways to radicalization, where individuals accept extremist ideologies and become willing to use violence to support their beliefs (Bakker, 2006; Borum, 2011a, 2011b; Hamm, 2007; Krueger, 2007; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Monahan, 2012; Sageman, 2004; Silber, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Stern, 2003). These models are complex, with some combining micro, meso, and macro-level variables to identify the attitudinal and social forces that influence individual action (Freilich & LaFree, 2015).

At the same time, it is clear that most individuals exposed to radical messages do not engage in acts of violence (Borum, 2011a). Radicalization theories recognize this potential variation, though they create a challenge for policy makers since they have sometimes

contradictory and non-parsimonious conclusions. Here we build upon those prior attempts that have considered radicalization in the context of criminological theories (Agnew, 2010; Freilich & LaFree, 2015; LaFree et al., in press), to account for the process of accepting radical ideologies and engaging in violence. Because radicalization is an ongoing process, we argue that it is useful to consider which foreground and situational dynamics lead an individual to engage in a particular radical extremist movement.

There are dozens of criminological theories with varying degrees of empirical support, operating at both the individual and group-level (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2009). Examining the existing radicalization literature, it appears that it is consistent with criminological control theories, particularly Hirschi's (1969) social bond theory and the more recent developmental control model of offending by Sampson and Laub (1992, 2003). These frameworks consider the factors that constrain individuals from engaging in crime and deviance, inclusive of both macro-level social conditions, and individual differences (Sampson & Laub, 2003). To that end, a U.S. study by LaFree et al. (in press) find that individuals with a poor work history are more likely to turn to violent extremism and interpret this as partial support for social control theory.

There is also evidence that individuals who engage in terrorism are influenced by ideologies they learn from others, whether based on religious, nationalist, or racial-based belief systems (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Hamm, 1993; Post, 1998). Moreover, there is evidence that political extremists learn from others the skills (e.g., how to build bombs) needed to commit attacks. Terrorist organizations sometimes copy effective tactics (such as IED attacks) that have proved useful to other terrorist groups. Terrorist belief systems share common connections to deviant subcultures that form on- or offline in reaction to or as a rejection of larger social norms to provide an alternative set of values and behaviours (Freilich & Chermak, 2012; Holt, Freilich, & Chermak, 2017; Miller, 1958). These elements directly reflect the influence of learning from and social engagement with criminal others on offending (Akers, 1998).

While both social control and social learning perspectives have been supported empirically in studies of traditional forms of crime (Laub, Sampson, & Sweeten, 2011; Pratt et al., 2010), they rely on differing theoretical rationales (Jensen & Akers, 2017). This leaves unanswered the question of whether these competing perspectives can be combined to provide a more complete explanation for understanding how individuals move towards committing ideologically-motivated crime. This study considers the utility of social control and social learning theories in accounting for radicalization towards illegal political extremism using a case study analysis of four perpetrators. Specifically, we selected two far-right and two jihadist actors, each representing offenders who engaged in either violent or non-violent crimes. We are interested in whether we can observe the relevance of these theories to understanding different types of offenders (violent v. non-violent) representing different ideologies (far right v. jihadist). We discuss the implications of this work for our understanding of the utility of radicalization theories relative to traditional criminological theories, and the potential for theoretical integration despite the differences that may exist between these frameworks.

Contrasting control and learning theories of crime

Two leading individual level theories of crime are social control (Hirschi, 1969; Sampson & Laub, 1992, 2003) and social learning (Akers, 1998) theories. They differ in their assumptions;

social control theorists argue that all individuals are motivated to offend, but are constrained by formal and informal regulatory forces (Sampson & Laub, 2003). Social learning theorists argue that criminality is a learned behavior like any other action with value and meaning informed by social relationships (Akers, 1998).

These theories also differ in their interpretation of one of the most consistently identified correlates of juvenile and adult offending: criminal peers. A large substantive body of research has investigated the link between friends or family involved in criminality and personal participation in offending. Researchers have found associations with delinquent or deviant peers to be both directly and indirectly linked to offending (Akers, 1998; Matsueda & Anderson, 1998; Pratt et al., 2010; Warr, 2002), but there are contradictory explanations of this relationship, leading to questions about the actual influence of peers on crime.

Sampson and Laub (1992) devised their influential dynamic control theory to account for both onset and desistance from crime. Individuals engage in offending due to weakened social bonds that vary depending on an individual's age. In early childhood, social structural factors, including parental unemployment and socioeconomic status, directly shape the ability of parents to form strong bonds to their children. Parenting styles and behavior also affect the formation of bonds, all of which help to constrain delinquency at early ages.

Youth who exhibit problematic behaviors early, such as conduct disorder or delinquency, may begin to erode parental bonds and diminish attachment to educational institutions. Weak bonds to parents and schools further increase the risk of delinquency, which can create a persistent pattern of offending behavior throughout adolescence. Involvement in deviance or delinquency will also minimize attachments to pro-social others, leading individuals to be isolated into anti-social peer networks which reinforce the likelihood of offending. As individuals age, there is an expected continuity of offending behavior, which can further minimize pro-social bonds that encourage school success and the pursuit of gainful employment. An individual's formation of pro-social bonds in late adolescence and early adulthood could also play a role in desisting from crime. It is important to consider the role of key events such as marriage, employment, and joining the military that have the potential to strengthen pro-social bonds.

By contrast, social learning theorists argue that peer associations are a necessary causal factor in individual offending, as criminality is communicated via social relationships with others (Akers, 1998). The primary learning framework was developed by Akers (1998) and combines tenets of differential association with the psychological principals of social rewards and punishments for behavior. Akers's (1998) social learning theory includes four variables: differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation. These components interact through a dynamic process with a significant influence on behavior. The social learning process begins with the relationships individuals have with deviants and non-deviants, or differential association (Akers, 1998). These relationships vary, though the most influential involve intimates such as family and friends. Most importantly, social ties provide individuals with a model for deviant or non-deviant behavior, depending on the differential associations they have toward groups involved in deviant behavior (Akers, 1998; Pratt et al., 2010).

Differential associations with deviant peers provide definitions for behavior that affect a person's attitude toward and perception of offending, especially justifications that neutralize the negative consequences of deviance (Akers, 1998). Those individuals who have a greater proportion of neutralizing definitions or beliefs supportive of deviant behavior will be more likely to engage in such activities (Jensen & Akers, 2017; Pratt et al., 2010).

The acceptance of definitions supportive of offending are critical to justify and foster behavior, though the impact of social reinforcements and punishments shape present and future action (Skinner, 1953). Reinforcements for behavior can be positive in nature, such as praise from peers, or negative, through the removal of unpleasant stimuli. At the same time, deviant behavior can also lead to punishments which can also be positive, such as the addition of unwanted responsibilities, or negative through the removal of valued resources or activities.

Finally, imitation plays a critical role in social learning, as an individual may engage in crime after watching someone else engage in such an act (Akers, 1998). As behaviors are repeated over time, the initial influence of imitation decreases relative to the role of differential reinforcements and definitions that favor offending. Several studies have found strong effects for imitation, though they are often absent in empirical tests due to their empirical overlap with differential association (Pratt et al., 2010).

Identifying control and learning theories in radicalization frameworks

Both social control and social learning theories have strong empirical support (Laub et al., 2011; Pratt et al., 2010) and account in part for the onset and persistence or desistance of routine criminal behavior during adolescence. Tests of social learning theory demonstrate the importance of deviant associations throughout late adolescence into adulthood for various offenses on- (see Bossler & Holt, 2016) and offline (Pratt et al., 2010). Assessments of Sampson and Laub (1992) developmental social control theory demonstrate the value of this framework to account for the factors affecting individual offending and desistence trajectories throughout the lifecourse (e.g. Laub et al., 2011).

Much like criminological inquiry, most researchers agree that the process of radicalization is multifaceted and no single theory can account for the entire phenomenon (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Borum, 2011a, 2011b; Horgan, 2009; Kimhi & Even, 2006; Linden & Klandermans, 2006; Taylor & Horgan, 2006). Some radicalization theories include aspects of control and learning frameworks, particularly the role of intimate associations and social rejection. Interestingly, radicalization theories, which originate from disciplines outside of criminology, usually fail to note their consistencies with criminology's control and learning theories. This study addresses this gap by explicitly making these connections. Both of these criminology theories, for instance, recognize the role of peers and family in exposing individuals to ideas and influences, though they differ in the mechanics by which these relationships affect action. Thus, the starting sources of exposure to radical ideologies and beliefs about racial or religious views are likely the same for social control and learning perspectives. For instance, individual attitudes toward and willingness to accept extremist beliefs are a function of exposure to these ideologies via social relationships on- and offline (Bakker, 2006; Sageman, 2004). Stern (2003) argues that group belonging is critical in radicalization toward a religious ideology and concludes that "in some cases, the desire to be with friends turns out to be more important, over time, than the desire to achieve any particular goal" (p. 5).

Several radicalization models recognize the importance of cognitive openings, where a personal crisis or sense of longing leaves individuals feeling adrift and thus receptive to new world views–a key to initiating the radicalization process (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Taylor & Horgan, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2004). This implies that the causal mechanisms for control theory (such

as increased marginalization and rejection or weaker attachment to others) initially occur in the radicalization process, while social learning factors only appear subsequently.

Peer networks can be a key source for such ideologies, as noted in research by Sageman (2004) who found terrorists linked to groupings of friends around mosques provided key opportunities for recruitment. Those exposed to radicalized messages may be more willing to accept and justify value-systems of an extremist movement and the use of violence as a political strategy (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Simi & Futrell, 2010). In other words, the solidarity experienced due to group membership may be a critical part of the radicalization process. Ezekiel's (1995) ethnographic research documented that some far-right racists set aside their personal desires and wants for the greater good of the movement. Silber and Bhatt (2007) conducted case studies on violent jihadists and concluded that solidarity is usually the last stage of the radicalization process. McCauley and Moskalenko's (2017) examination of case studies also found some individuals involved with small terrorist cells developed increased group cohesion and an "us v. them" mind-set. Solidarity strengthens individual beliefs in a cause, or in a greater good, and bonds the individual to other group members and the beliefs of the movement. Such solidarity can be maintained or managed in interactions with others in the movement (face-to-face and electronically), by their dress and adoption of symbols, and by their willingness to take action to support the movement (Hamm, 2002; Kirby, 2007; Neuberger & Valentini, 1996).

Accepting a radical ideology may lead individuals to experience social rejection from prosocial others in keeping with social control frameworks. For example, Freilich et al. (2014) found that the acceptance of violent, anti-government, or conspiratorial beliefs leave white nationalists on the fringes of society and isolated from others (see also Simi & Futrell, 2006, 2010). Publicly sharing these views is risky, as pro-social others may ridicule or reject the person for their beliefs. More overt acknowledgement of membership or affiliation to a white supremacist group can lead to negative, and maybe even violent, reactions from community members and employers (Blee, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Simi & Futrell, 2010). These factors may increase the outward expression of ideological support and the chances for real world action (Hamm, 2002; Kirby, 2007; Neuberger & Valentini, 1996; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

The present study

Concepts from both control and learning perspectives are evident in research on radicalization. The acceptance of a radical ideology is a learned process where individuals accept increasingly extreme ideas that justify violent behavior. At the same time, individuals with few pro-social bonds may be more likely to be exposed to radical movements at the outset. Research is needed that compares populations of both violent and non-violent offenders across ideologies to understand the roles of social control and learning in the radicalization process. Here we consider the extent to which the temporal ordering of control and learning mechanisms operate within radicalization and criminality generally. There is also a need to understand the extent to which these processes operate for violent and non-violent extremists. Though violent actors appear to have greater involvement in radical groups, it is unclear how these factors shape behaviour among those engaged in non-violent crimes or provide material support to extremists. To address these questions, we employed a case study methodology to compare two far-right actors and two jihadists who committed either violent or non-violent offenses.

Data and methods

The four perpetrators were selected from a larger project that integrates the perpetrators identified in two of the leading data collection efforts on US-focused terrorism and extremist behaviors – the ECDB and PIRUS databases. The United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) includes the names of over 2,100 perpetrators who are supporters of far-right, eco-terrorists, or al Qaeda inspired or affiliated (AQAM) extremist ideologies, who committed ideologically motivated homicides, other violent crimes (e.g., bombings and arson), and foiled plots in the United States since 1990, or who were involved in non-violent financial crimes. These offenders include both hate crime offenders (purposefully targeting racial or religious minorities) and terrorist offenders (purposefully targeting the U.S. government or society at large). The PIRUS database currently consists of approximately 1,600 violent and non-violent ideologically motivated criminals from far-right, far-left and radical Islamic ideologies within the United States. PIRUS includes over 150 variables capturing basic demography, radicalization risk factors and mobilization mechanisms, and radicalization trajectory lengths and outcomes.

Four perpetrators were purposely selected from these two databases who were well covered in open sources and that varied on a number of attributes such as whether they were mentally ill, or whether they committed their offense as a loner or acted with others. The four offenders encompassed one violent far-right offender, one non-violent far-right offender, one violent jihadi offender, and one non-violent jihadi offender. An actor from each category was included to develop a comparison between violent and non-violent actors as well as different ideologies to understand the extent to which jihadists and far-right actors differ in their backgrounds and influences. We also were interested in determining what, if any, similarities existed across all four cases despite the varying ideologies, crime types, and other attributes (e.g. mental illness) outlined above.

Both ECDB and PIRUS data are based on publicly available information, drawing especially on court documents and newspaper accounts. For example, the ECDB draws from nearly 30 search engines simultaneously, uncovering thousands of pages related to particular cases. We compiled all source materials that were available, and then we repeated our search/document protocols for each case (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014; Jensen & LaFree, 2016). In Table 1 below, we provide a table that includes the type of sources by source type of documents that guided our understanding of these perpetrators. These documents include a wide range of source material, but importantly significant information was available relating to each perpetrator's background and the processes that were particularly influential as they moved to commit ideologically motivated crimes.

We devised a detailed case study template that included a series of questions tapping key constructs from both social learning and social control theories. The template also focused on these offenders' social media presence and activities (see Appendix 1). Below we briefly review these four offenders' radicalization processes and criminal behaviors. The four summaries below do not contain references due to space constraints. A breakdown of the commonalities across our variables of interest within each case study is provided in Table 2.

Robert dear (violent far rightist)

CRIMES: Far rightist Robert Dear opened fire at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs killing three and injuring nine, on November 27, 2015. The attack resulted in a

Table 1. Distribution of Sources by Case Study.

Source Type						
Name	Official Documents	News	Other Website/ Blog	Scholarly Work	Watch Group	Total
Robert Dear	1	80	3	0	1	85
Mir Aimal Kasi	4	53	0	1	0	58
Russell Dean Landers	15	131	3	0	9	158
Khalid Ouzzani	11	34	18	0	15	78
Total	31	298	24	1	25	379

five-hour siege by law enforcement authorities. In the ensuing shootout, Dear was wounded in the right hand and lower abdomen. He had initially considered targeting the FBI but instead chose to target what he considered "the most evil place on earth," a Planned Parenthood clinic, because his attack was "all about saving babies." In an interview with a local news channel from prison, Dear stated the attack "wasn't planned … It was just a spur of the moment."

BRIEF BIO: Robert Dear Jr. was born in Charleston, South Carolina in 1958. He held a college degree in public administration from an unnamed university and had previously attended two other universities. During the 1980s he held several fast-food management training jobs and later worked at a power company. From 1989, he worked for himself as an "artist's representative" which involved selling prints to art galleries.

Dear married in December 1979 and had a son the next year, though he separated from his wife three and a half years later. Dear then married another woman, but soon fathered another child with his first wife. In 1990, while still married to his second wife, he fathered a child with another woman, who became his third wife. Dear divorced his second wife in 1992 and his third wife in 2001. At the time of the shooting incident, Dear lived with his girlfriend of seven years in an RV that had no electricity or running water. His second wife reported that, "he constantly criticizes everyone around him and he is very hard to please. He really does not have any friends. He does not trust anyone."

Dear was ultimately found unfit to stand trial and the judge concluded that his "perceptions and understanding are not rational and are not grounded in reality." Dear remains indefinitely confined in the Colorado state mental hospital.

RADICALIZATION PROCESSES: Despite his gambling, philandering and violence, Dear viewed himself as an ardent Christian. At the age of 9, he claims to have been struck by lightning and saw this as a religious experience. Dear appears to have never formally joined a far-right organization and open sources showed that he was involved in no known collective activity of far-right groups. Instead, he became a supporter of the movement and subscribed to its extremist beliefs without having any known direct physical contact with other movement members. Instead, Dear listened to far-right shortwave radio hosts such as Brother Stair, William Cooper, Pete Peters, and Texe Marrs. Dear also read right-wing conspiracy magazines like the *Prophecy Club, The Spotlight* and *Paranoia*. Finally, Dear's online activity exposed him to Alex Jones, and other far-right websites.

For well over a decade, Robert Dear consumed far-right materials from the print and electronic media. Dear once commented: "I'm a loner. I don't talk to anyone. I just found this stuff [e.g. the radicalizing materials] searching web sites." In addition to the already mentioned radio shows, Dear listened to *The Mandy Connell Show* which spent a lot of time during

Table 2. Commonalities of Variables across Case Study Actors.

	Robert Dear	Russell Dean Landers	Miri Kasi	Khalid Ouazzani
Role of Peers and Family in exposure (online; offline)	No far right, offline group exposure, but significantly exposed to online literature, conspiracy theories, extremist radio hosts, and websites	Mostly offline activities, very active in far right anti-government movement, participating in seminars and educating others about ways to defraud government	Was friendly with extremists; travelled with friends who were Mujahedeen to deliver arms; Family may have worked with Pakistani intelligence service	Mostly offline connections to members of al Qaida; travelled to Middle East and interacted directly; Also, had online communications with others. No evidence of negative family or peer influences
Cognitive Opening	Struck by lightening and viewed as religious experience	Loss of family farm to foreclosure	American involvement in Soviet-Afghan war; and targeted CIA for harm done to family. Death of family	Failed business operations; and nonideological criminal behaviors
Social Bonds Through Networking	Few connections offline; at odds with co-workers; family members	Landers' only identified friendships were with others in the extremist movement, including members of WTP and the Montana Freemen. Committed multiple offenses with other members, and shared strategies	Meet friends at universities; and friends and family involved in transporting arms	Meet others involved in the movement online or through travel
Social Rejection	Loner; "Doesn't have any friends," "criticizes everyone" Problems at work and home	Loner; Not strong bonds with others in the movement;	Loner; Despite opportunities (family was successful), Kasi was a loners, was not closely connected to his siblings, and had medical health issues	Strong family; effort to support family with criminal activities

the summer before the attack referring to eight faked videos of Planned Parenthood selling baby parts. The Connell show also promoted this coverage via its Twitter and Facebook feeds. One article elaborates upon a video supposedly shot at the Colorado Springs clinic that Dear later attacked. The fact that Dear repeatedly refers to the selling of body parts suggests that these videos may have played a part in his transition to act violently.

According to his then wife, as Dear became more interested in the right-wing movement, he began "compulsively reading the Bible … [and] started obsessing about Judgement Day." Dear said that before his fatal attack he "prayed to God to let me be David from the Bible, a mighty man of valor. I prayed and he granted my wish." Dear had also frequented the website SexyAds, sometimes to solicit females, and other times to deride others for not following the teachings of Christ.

According to Robb (2016), "the right-wing media didn't just tell him what he wanted to hear. They brought authority and detail to a world he was convinced was tormenting him. They were his shelter and his inspiration, his only real community." Over the years Dear endorsed several abortion-related conspiracies and praised other extremist attackers of abortion providers and posted messages of support on anti-abortion websites.

However, Dear's mental issues may also have played a role in this deadly attack and his prior crimes. Around the time of his first known violent radical attack, Dear's life was on a downward trajectory. Dear had confrontations with co-workers and a history of lashing out when feeling slighted. His second wife recalled Dear was "obsessed with revenge" and "erupts into fury" in seconds and had "emotional problems". Around the time of his initial contacts with a radical milieu, these actions turned to physical violence. This included slamming his second wife's head into a floor because she moved his motorcycle helmet and other occasions where he kicked her and pulled her hair. His third wife also reported physical abuse. On one occasion he used a Taser on his pet labrador dogs. During this phase he was convicted of unlawfully carrying a long-blade knife and loaded gun. He was also charged with rape, though the case was dropped when a key witness did not testify. Other alleged criminal actions include threatening the life of a neighbor, animal cruelty, peeping tom incidents, and shooting the neighbor's dog. In fact, a second neighbor filed a restraining order against Dear.

Russell Dean Landers (non-violent far rightist)

CRIMES: Far rightist Russell Dean Landers was a sovereign citizen and a Montana Freeman. Landers was first arrested in Brooklyn, New York in July 1994 following a traffic violation when he and others were driving home from an anti-government group meeting in an unlicensed and unregistered white van with an unregistered firearm. Landers claimed he could not be arrested because he was a sovereign citizen, marshal, and common-law judge with diplomatic immunity.

Dean was indicted in 1995 in Colorado and New York on charges of securities fraud, conspiracy, criminal impersonation, and theft due to his involvement in a We the People (WTP) (an extreme anti-tax organization) scheme. From 1992 to 1995, Landers and his WTP co-conspirators defrauded 6,000 people of millions of dollars by claiming they could obtain money from a fictitious lawsuit that had declared the federal reserve bankrupt as well as their foreclosed land and prior loan payments by filing a $300 claim with WTP. Landers also filed false liens against the Colorado judge handling the fraud case. Charges were later

dropped in New York, but Landers failed to appear for his January 1996 Colorado trial and retreated to the Montana Freemen ranch named Justus Township where he and his associates were involved in an 81-day non-violent standoff with the FBI. All other defendants in the WTP Colorado case were convicted.

Dear was convicted in North Carolina in February 1997 and sentenced to 30 years in prison for additional schemes occurring in 1995 and 1996. He was later convicted in Montana in July 1998 for bank fraud, mail fraud, threatening public officials, and interstate transport of stolen property in connection with schemes involving comptroller warrants, or state issued checks for various outstanding payments. Landers was sentenced to 11 years and 3 months to be served concurrently with his North Carolina sentence. He was convicted a third time in November 2007 for a scheme committed while in prison involving an attempt to extort the warden for release.

Landers was originally incarcerated at El Reno Federal Correctional Institution. In 2003, he collaborated with four other inmates including an African American sovereign citizen, which is unique in that many far-right extremists also have racist ideologies, although no such evidence exists for Landers. Landers and his co-conspirators claimed their names were copyrighted based on the "redemption" theory that argues that the US government claimed its citizens as collateral for use in international lending when it changed the currency system and eliminated the gold standard. Redemption theory proponents therefore claim that citizens are entitled to government payments for the use of their names. When the El Reno warden failed to pay, the defendants filed liens against the warden's property. Landers was subsequently convicted in November 2007 along with his co-conspirators on charges of conspiracy and extortion and sentenced to 15 years to be served consecutively with their existing prison terms. Landers is currently incarcerated in the Terre Haute Federal Correctional Institution and scheduled for release on December 2, 2040.

BRIEF BIO: Russell Dean Landers was born in Iowa in 1952. We know little about his education. He lived and worked on the family farm in Greene, Iowa until the early 1980s when it was foreclosed by the government, though the exact reason for the foreclosure is unknown. Landers then worked as an insurance salesman until he was accused of defrauding his clients by promoting illegal living trusts in 1992. After this, he worked full time promoting other illegal financial schemes.

Landers was married when he became involved in WTP in 1992. In 1993 he had an affair with fellow extremist and WTP member Dana Dudley who had a long criminal history, including cocaine distribution and precipitating a violent felony. When Landers' then-wife found out, she reported the WTP to Iowa authorities and turned over boxes of bank documents and other evidence of his illegal schemes, prompting a judge to issue a restraining order and seize the group's bank account in 1993. Landers and Dudley, who was referred to as his common-law wife, left Iowa in 1994 and moved to Four Oaks, North Carolina, which was their last known address in 1996 before moving in with the Montana Freemen. Landers appears to have no biological children.

RADICALIZATION PROCESSES: Russell Dean Landers' associations with other anti-government extremists encouraged his adoption of extremist ideology and eventually led to his criminal activity. The loss of his family farm to foreclosure also appears to have precipitated his anti-government views. Landers did not appear to maintain long-term, pro-social activities or peer relationships. It is not clear whether his radicalization preceded or

immediately followed an Iowa civil complaint for insurance fraud, but the nature of the scheme (illegal versions of living trusts) and his initial involvement with WTP were noted around the same time.

Landers became involved with WTP in 1992 after the Iowa Attorney General charged him with a civil consumer fraud complaint for cheating people by setting up illegal versions of living trusts for insurance clients. Former Iowa State Police Chief Scott Hildebrand introduced Landers to the anti-government, anti-tax WTP group. Landers quickly became treasurer of WTP in Iowa, responsible for spreading the group's message in the eastern United States.

Landers was married, but left his wife and became romantically involved with another anti-government supporter of WTP who had a criminal history and existing ties to far-right groups. The couple seemed to amplify each other's extremist tendencies. In addition, Landers' failure to achieve success through legitimate means (maintain his family farm, support his family through his job as an insurance salesman) could have led to the belief that the government was against him and therefore illegitimate.

Landers' only identified friendships were with others in the extremist movement, including members of WTP and the Montana Freemen with whom he was involved in criminal activities. It is not clear how close these relationships were and whether they could be considered strong friendship ties. His well-documented relationship with Dana Dudley may have been his only notable long-term relationship after joining the extremist movement. As noted by Peter Stern, "chief justice" of "Our One Supreme Court," a common-law court tribunal operated out of North Carolina, the couple moved around frequently and may not have cultivated long-term friendships. Assistant Attorney General of Iowa Stephen Reno commented that Landers has "been a con artist for a long time. I think he started out with all this to make money and I think he's bought into this anti-government philosophy in the meantime. He's a brainwashed human being …"

After moving from Iowa to North Carolina, Landers and Dudley became involved in several other anti-government groups together, including "Our One Supreme Court" and the "Civil Rights Task Force." The groups established their own common law courts like those of the Freemen and Landers identified himself as justice of the Johnston County court. Landers also became involved with tax lien actions levied by IRS revenue officers against James Vincent Wells for a tobacco fraud conspiracy.

In December 1995, Landers along with others close to him, including Wells, attended a two-day seminar presented by Montana Freemen leader Leroy Schweitzer on the use of fraudulent financial instruments known as comptroller warrants. In January 1996, Landers and Wells sent IRS officers "true bills" outlining their personal liability in the form of $100 million in silver coins, which was to extend for 99 years. Later that month, letters were sent to the officers instructing them to appear before "Our One Supreme Court," a common law tribunal linked to the Montana Freemen that held unauthorized trials and levied judgments against government officials and private citizens, to face the judgment referred to in the earlier letters sent by Landers and Wells, where Landers presented Wells' case before the "court."

Landers subscribes to numerous beliefs consistent with the sovereign citizen ideology. Landers believes he is a sovereign, foreign entity and both federal and state courts have no authority over him. Self-proclaimed freemen like Landers instead claim to abide by parts of the U.S. and state constitutions, common law, the Bible, the Magna Carta, and the Uniform Commercial Code. In response to his indictments, Landers declared that any actions against

him were invalid. He also claimed the government was a "contractual form of government for the slaves in the form of United States citizens/aliens owing allegiance to a foreign prince." Landers strongly adhered to his beliefs even to the point of putting others in danger and demonstrating a lack of concern for their well-being. He was recorded during the Montana Freemen standoff saying "however many of them go out in a body bag before I go is not going to make a damn difference to me," referring to the FBI agents.

Mir Aimal Kasi (violent jihadist)

CRIMES: Mir Aimal Kasi, a Pakistani national, shot five CIA employees, killing two, outside CIA headquarters on January 25, 1993. At approximately 7:50 AM, Kasi stopped his car behind a line of cars waiting at the main entrance of CIA headquarters, exited, and began shooting at drivers. After the shooting, Kasi drove to a park approximately a mile away. While it is unclear why Kasi went to the park, he later wrote that he had not expected to survive the attack. After waiting for 90 min, Kasi drove home, changed his clothes, and watched TV coverage of the attack. When Kasi realized that police did not have an accurate description of his car or a license plate number, he went for lunch and then purchased a one-way ticket to Pakistan. On January 26, Kasi flew to Pakistan from New York. Mir Aimal Kasi would remain at large for four and a half years in Afghanistan where he received protection from the Mujahedeen.

In May 1997, an unnamed Afghan man approached officials at the U.S. consulate in Karachi claiming he and others could help arrest Kasi. The consulate official told the informant that Kasi would need to be brought to Pakistan where he could be arrested. Kasi was then lured to Pakistan and arrested by the Pakistani authorities who released him to FBI officials. Kasi was flown to the United States where he was convicted of murder, sentenced to death, and then executed on November 14, 2002.

In December 1997, Kasi penned a series of letters to Salon reporter Jeff Stein. Kasi accepted responsibility for the 1993 shooting and wrote that he attacked the CIA to "punish those who do wrong things against Muslim countries like Iraq." Initially, Kasi's plan was to shoot James Woolsey (CIA director) or Robert Gates (former director). Once Kasi realized he could not get access to them, he chose to target instead front-line employees.

BRIEF BIO: Kasi was born in 1964 to a wealthy family in Quetta, Pakistan. Kasi was the only child of a prominent businessman and his second wife. He had nine half-brothers/sisters, but did not appear to have close connections with any of them. Kasi's family belongs to the Kasi tribe, a Pashtun ethnic group in Pakistan. The Kasi tribe is large, wealthy, and many of its members hold high-level government positions. The tribe controls areas in the southwest province of Baluchistan, Pakistan, eastern Afghanistan, and border regions of Iran. Mir Aimal Kasi's family owned an entire downtown block and two hotels in Quetta, in addition to several businesses and orchards in Baluchistan.

Kasi had a comfortable childhood in an observant Muslim household, was described as a "pampered rich boy," and was his parents' favorite. Despite this lifestyle, Kasi as a child was an isolated loner, had a violent temper, and suffered from health issues including seizures. He attended the elite Saint Francis grammar school in Quetta, run by local Catholic authorities. He was a weak student. After graduating from grammar school, Kasi attended a government-run college in Quetta, studying political science. After graduating with a bachelor's

degree in political science, Kasi enrolled at the University of Baluchistan in 1987, and grad-uated with a Masters in English literature in 1988.

In December 1990, Kasi acquired a forged U.S. visa in Karachi and entered the United States on February 27, 1991 through JFK airport in New York. On February 3, 1992, Kasi applied for political asylum, and on February 12 he received a one-year authorization to work in the United States. He worked several jobs and, around August or September of 1992, became employed by Excel Courier Inc. As a courier, Kasi became familiar with the area surrounding CIA headquarters.

RADICALIZATION PROCESSES: Kasi's anti-American radical attitudes appear to have developed while attending the government-run college in Quetta during the 1980s. He joined a Pashtun nationalist group and participated in anti-American demonstrations. Kasi's negative attitudes toward the United States seem to have been due to the Soviet-Afghan war, and American involvement in that conflict. In college, Kasi appears to have been friendly with extremists. Kasi told researcher Jessica Stern that he traveled several times with friends who were Mujahedeen to deliver arms from Pakistan to Afghanistan. There are disputed reports from a Pakistani intelligence officer that Kasi's father and older brothers were directly involved in transporting weapons from the CIA to Afghan fighters. CIA officials and the Kasi family denied these reports. Other media reports claim that members of the Kasi family worked for the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI), which acted as an intermediary between the CIA and Afghan rebels. After Kasi's capture in 1997, Kasi claimed that he attacked the CIA in revenge for wrongs done to his family.

While living in the United States, Kasi appears to have kept largely to himself. His transition from radical ideology to radical action appears to be motivated in part by the death of his parents: his mother in 1982 and his father in 1989. Friends reported that both of their deaths left Kasi mentally unstable. He was not close to his other half-siblings, never married, and did not have close peer attachments. Kasi became increasingly enraged by the Persian Gulf War and Israeli treatment of Palestinians. He claimed in 1997 that the tipping point was watching U.S. forces bomb Iraqi forces as they retreated from Kuwait in 1991. Several years after his conviction, while on death row, Kasi claimed in a letter to Jessica Stern that his motivation for the attack was Israeli treatment of Palestinians, not the Gulf War.

Khalid Ouzzani (non-violent financial/material support crimes)

CRIMES: Khalid Ouazzani engaged in several financial crimes, including bank fraud, food stamp fraud, and money laundering, providing some proceeds from these schemes to two al Qaida affiliates, Wasam El-Hanafi and Sabirhan Hasanoff, in support of overseas terrorist operations. He also provided information and other support to these two affiliates as they took early steps in a plot targeting the New York Stock Exchange and provided additional supplies to al Qaida members in Yemen. In 2007 and 2008, Ouazzani personally provided over $23,500 to al Qaida. In August 2007, he paid $6,500 to al Qaida through a wire transfer and in June/July 2008 provided $17,000 from the proceeds of a sale of property in the United Arab Emirates purchased with money from a fraudulently obtained loan (described below). Ouazzani discussed various ways to provide other advice and assistance to al Qaida from August 2007 to February 2010, including plans to fight for the group in Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia. Hasanoff and El-Hanafi also provided watches, cold-weather gear, GPS units, and a remote-control car.

Ouazzani engaged in several other fraud schemes. Beginning in December 2006, he purchased several real estate properties in Missouri at tax foreclosures and made false statements on loan applications (including the value of the property and personal financial information) to obtain home equity loans of $278,000 from Bank of America. He ultimately withdrew almost all of this money, which was substantially more than the properties were actually worth. In March 2007, he started a company known as Hafsaa LLC with the fake registration name "Truman Used Auto Parts" and used it to open a $170,000 commercial loan from Union Bank in Kansas City Missouri. He falsely stated the value of the business inventory and the acquisition of the appropriate regulatory licenses and used these resources to divert money from the business for his personal use, defaulting on the loan payments. Some of this money was illegally transferred from his loan accounts to banks in Morocco, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates in the names of other individuals. He defrauded the owner of a salvage yard building for the business by refusing to pay his bills and a prospective purchaser of Hafssa LLC of $100,000 by misrepresenting the value of the business and concealing its loan debt.

In March 2009, Ouazzani falsely stated that his aunt was the owner of a cellular wireless telephone business in Kansas City that he operated in order to apply for home equity loans from Bank Midwest N.A. and Mazuma Credit Union. He attempted to obtain loans on the property he was renting and other properties that he claimed his aunt owned and generated rental income from, but was denied the loan because the banks determined his aunt did not live in Kansas City. Finally, from October 2006 to March 2009, Ouazzani defrauded the State of Missouri and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services by falsely concealing his bank accounts and ownership interests in property and businesses to obtain food stamps.

Ouazzani was indicted and arrested in February 2010 on charges of bank fraud (18 counts), money laundering (10 counts), interstate fraud (2 counts), and false statements to a government agency (3 counts). He pled guilty in May 2010 to one count of bank fraud, one count of money laundering, and one count of material support for terrorism. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison and agreed to forfeit $558,900. He is imprisoned at Three Rivers Federal Correctional Institution and is scheduled to be released April 17, 2022.

BRIEF BIO: Khalid Ouazzani was born on December 17, 1977 in Morocco and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2006. He claimed numerous residences in Missouri, New York, and New Jersey. Ouazzani was married on December 2, 2006 and had two children. Ouazzani appeared committed to his family since he tried to obtain money from his financial schemes to support them.

Ouazzani worked as a self-employed used auto parts salesman and real estate investor. He used both businesses to further his financial schemes. The extent of Ouazzani's peer relationships is unclear aside from his interactions with his co-conspirators, of which little is known. Ouazzani attended the Islamic Society of Greater Kansas City, but center director Mustafa Hussein said he only had brief encounters with him.

RADICALIZATION PROCESSES: The exact point of Ouazzani's exposure to extremist ideology is not clear. He began contributing funds to aid al Qaida in late 2007 through contacts with al Qaida affiliates Wasam El-Hanafi and Sabirhan Hasanoff. It is not clear why he began interacting with these men, or why he decided to start contributing money. Ouazzani had no known contact with other terrorist organizations. In February 2008, El-Hanafi traveled to Yemen where he met two al Qaida members, swore allegiance to the group, and received

assignments to carry out attacks in the United States. In May 2008, El-Hanafi met with Ouazzani in Brooklyn, New York to discuss joining al Qaida.

In June 2008, Ouazzani formally swore an oath of allegiance to al Qaida and provided Hasanoff with $17,000 in U.S. currency obtained from the sale of property in the United Arab Emirates to be provided to al Qaida. In August 2008, Hasanoff performed surveillance on the New York Stock Exchange in preparation for a possible terrorist attack at the direction of al Qaida members overseas. Ouazzani was accused of providing information and support to Hasanoff and El-Hanafi in the pursuit of the plot, although this appears to be the extent of his involvement. The three associates were pushed by al Qaida to travel overseas to engage in jihad, but because they were unwilling to become martyrs, they were encouraged to remain in the United States.

There was no evidence of negative social interactions with peer groups, nor negative family relationships. Ouazzani did have failed real estate investments and he performed poorly as a used car salesman. As his business operations failed he engaged in fraud by falsifying loan documents for lines of credit to obtain financing. However, it is not clear if the fraud was the result of his failure in these ventures, or if these ventures were used to carry out the fraud. Ouazzani was married with two children. There is no information about whether his wife was aware of what Ouazzani was doing in either his support for terrorist organizations or in his criminal financial activities. Ouazzani attended the local mosque, but there is no information about the quality of his interactions there.

Much of the case against Ouazzani was built with intercepted electronic communications (unclear if email or telephone) between him and an al Qaida member in Yemen through the NSA sponsored PRISM program which collected signals intelligence via various digital sources. In one email from October 2007 Hasanoff encouraged Ouazzani to pay back his portion of a monetary contribution to al Qaida that Hasanoff had covered. El-Hanafi had purchased a subscription to encryption software meant to enable secure online communication and showed members of al Qaida how to use it, although it is not clear to what extent Ouazzani used it. Hasanoff and El-Hanafi had frequent contact online between January and July 2009 talking about fighting jihad, finding other al Qaida contacts, and using coded language, such as "safari" instead of "jihad" and "hospitalized" instead of "in prison."

Analysis

Early life social bonds and peer associations

The existing open source evidence for the early lives of three of the four actors suggests that they were loners, with the exception of Ouazzani. For example, Kasi had trouble socializing with others and he exhibited violent tendencies at an early age, setting his classroom on fire at 8 years of age in an apparent attempt at revenge against a teacher. Kasi's college peers appear to have been politically extreme. Kasi told Jessica Stern that he traveled several times with friends in the Mujahedeen to deliver arms from Pakistan. He also was highly involved in the Pashtun nationalist movement, and seemingly associated with others who shared this interest.

Though it is difficult to surmise the extent to which either learning or control frameworks apply in early adolescence to these cases, there is better evidence to consider the role of peers and social rejection in the radicalization processes of these four actors as they

approached adulthood. Both far-right actors, Dear and Landers, and the violent jihadist Kasi appeared to have had difficulty establishing pro-social ties to others in their communities. Dear was married three times, with all spouses reporting physical abuse, as well as neighbors who complained of threats against themselves and their pets. In keeping with evidence from Kasi's youth, his neighbors and associates suggested he had few friends aside from his roommate. Although Ouazzani did not appear to have many friends, he was married with two children and may have started to commit fraud in part to support his family.

The Landers case provides the clearest support for the utility of social control theory in enmeshing an actor into a criminal network leading to the loss of pro-social others. Landers was married with a job as an insurance salesman, though he was engaged in fraudulent activities involving the illegal use of living trusts with his clients. The Iowa Attorney General brought a civil consumer fraud complaint against Landers in 1993 for these activities, at which point he was introduced to the We the People (WTP) party by a former Iowa Police Chief named Scott Hildebrand. WTP is an anti-tax anti-government group that is part of the broader sovereign citizen movement, which may have either been attractive to Landers because his family farm was foreclosed on in the 1980s, or because he recognized it as a way to engage in further fraud.

Regardless, Landers quickly became committed to the group, becoming its treasurer. He also engaged in an extramarital affair with fellow WTP member Dana Dudley, who was also a member of the militant group Constitutional Rangers based in Kansas and Nebraska. Dudley had a long criminal history, including drug and violent crime charges. Landers and Dudley soon left Iowa and became active in recruiting and messaging about the WTP agenda. In fact, Landers was among those sent by anti-government groups to Montana to learn from the Montana Freemen strategies for utilizing fake financial instruments.

The case of Ouazzani is the exception among the four individuals in this sample as he appears to have been family-oriented with few instances of pro-criminal socialization. While he had few peers or friends, he was married with two children to a non-criminal spouse who was surprised at his arrest. He also appears to have attended a mosque that had no radical or extremist ties. Instead, he somehow developed an interest in joining al Qaida and was only able to do so after meeting two men from Yemen associated with the group in 2006.

Radicalization as a function of social ties

Of the four cases, only Dean appears to have self-radicalized via exposure to radical ideas. He picked up a radical agenda regarding far-right and anti-abortion narratives via a mix of sources. Initially, he was exposed to content via shortwave radio narratives from Brother Stair, Pete Peters, and Texe Marrs, as well as right wing conspiracy magazines. The rise of Alex Jones via the Internet increased access to these ideas and promoted extremist views on abortion and abortion clinics via Twitter and Facebook. He occasionally interacted with anti-abortion activists offline but there is no evidence that they recruited him. Additionally, his mental state may have increased his susceptibility to these ideas. He was diagnosed after engaging in the clinic shooting as having "delusional disorder, persecutory type" by psychiatrists. Dear reportedly believed he was subject to FBI surveillance and on YouTube he claimed that President Obama was the Antichrist.

The remaining three cases were all radicalized or activated in part by social ties. As noted, Russell Landers was directly able to engage with the WTP movement through social

introductions and ties to individuals within the group. Kasi appears to have been exposed to Pashtun national and separatist ideologies as a youth. The majority of his exposure to radical anti-western sentiment emerged during his college years in the 1980s based on travel to Afghanistan with friends to deliver arms to the Mujahedeen. Kasi also attended rallies and events, but it is not clear if this was a function of direct recruitment by peers or purely self-interest.

Though the source of Ouazzani's interest in supporting al Qaida is not clearly identified, his activities are a direct result of direction and facilitation by social handlers. He began contributing funds to aid al Qaida in late 2007 through contacts with al Qaida affiliates Wasam El-Hanafi and Sabirhan Hasanoff. In May 2008, El-Hanafi met with Ouazzani in Brooklyn, New York to discuss joining al Qaida. He formally swore an oath of allegiance to the group in June of the same year, and provided Hasanoff with $17,000 in U.S. currency to be given to al Qaida. He engaged in a variety of fraudulent schemes, including manipulating loan applications to obtain funds that could be delivered to al Qaida. Ouazzani also engaged in surveillance of the New York Stock Exchange in preparation for a physical attack, though an attack never materialized. His contacts were also primarily phone or email based rather than in person. In fact, Ouazzani was arrested based on electronic intercepts between himself and an al Qaida member in Yemen.

Discussion and conclusions

Though research on radicalization to illegal political extremism has expanded over the last decade (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Borum 2011a, 2011b; Horgan, 2009; Kimhi & Even, 2006; Linden & Klandermans, 2006; Taylor & Horgan, 2006), theoretical models to account for this process are largely uninformed by criminological research. Traditional theories of crime, most notably social learning and social control, are evident in radicalization models, though they do not deal with the inherent differences in the role of peers and social relationships in engendering criminality. This analysis attempted to address the underlying theoretical assumptions evident in radicalization models through a case-study analysis of four individuals: two far-right actors and two jihadists, each engaging in violent or non-violent activities.

The findings provide initial support for aspects of social control, particularly in the role of peers in facilitating social relationships that increase radicalization and engender criminality. Three of the four cases in this sample, including violent and non-violent far-right actors and jihadists, involved social ties that provided access to radical messaging or resources to offend. Additionally, weakened social controls from peers, family, and spouses that may have limited exposure to pro-social others were also evident in two of the four cases, though they were respectively non-violent far-right actor and violent jihadist.

By comparison, there was less support for the role of social learning as peers communicated definitions supportive of radical ideologies, but did not consistently serve as sources of imitation nor play much of a role with respect to differential reinforcement for behavior. The Landers case demonstrates long-term integration into an offender network that may have influenced his behavior. Additionally, Ouazzani appears to have been influenced by al Qaida operatives, though it is not clear that they directly shaped his desire to radicalize. Instead they were able to direct his actions after he engaged with them online.

It is important to note that the Internet played a role in the radicalization processes of two of the four actors examined. For Ouazzani and Dear, the Internet served as a source of social connections and messaging that enabled acceptance of radical ideas. Additionally, Ouazzani appeared to have been directed by al Qaida handlers via email. The fact that the Kasi and Landers cases occurred early in the explosive growth of social media as a form of communication may have limited its applicability to those cases. Additional research using more recent incidents to better identify the extent to which technology mediates the relationship between peers, sources of social control, and the radicalization process will be helpful (Holt et al., 2017).

Though instructive, the preliminary nature of this study demands further research to examine the extent to which these theories can account for the radicalization process generally. Social control and learning frameworks were designed to account for delinquency and crime, which occur more frequently than acts of radical violence. As a result, it may be more useful to explore the extent to which these frameworks can account for the expression of radical or terrorist ideologies on- and offline.

Since the communication of an ideological belief via interpersonal communications in person or online may be more common than expressive violence, understanding its connection to ideological speech may help demonstrate the generalizability of these theories to radicalization. The communication of radical ideas can be identified in both social learning frameworks as a form of differential definition espoused by potential deviant peers that influence individual action. Similarly, increased attachments to those who espouse anti-social beliefs may increase an individual's acceptance of those ideas in the context of social control theories. Empirical assessment is needed to examine the factors associated with the expression of ideological beliefs and their relationship to violent action (Holt et al., 2017). In the event that both communication and violence are associated with elements of social control and learning, the utility of these theories may be more concretely demonstrated when compared to examinations of only one form of action.

There is also a need to understand how radicalization may differ across ideological boundaries, whether left, right or religious-based. Evidence suggests there are distinct differences in the process of recruitment and radicalization across ideologies (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Cilluffo et al., 2010; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Watts, 2008). Any parsimonious radicalization theory would still have operational utility across types (Tittle, 1995), thus empirical investigation is needed to understand the utility of any integrated framework.

The development of an integrated framework also has implications for our understanding of the process of desistance, or deradicalization on the basis of whether a social learning or social control model is used. For instance, Horgan (2014) noted that the utility of prison-based deradicalization initiatives may break down once the individual is released back into the community. At that time, it is essential to employ strategies that focus on "strengthening the social bonds that will either keep someone in their community or, if severed, pull them back into violent extremism" (Horgan, 2014, para. 22.) There is also a need to understand the extent to which social relationships on- or offline influence the shift from belief and ideological expression to actual behavior (Holt et al., 2017). Individuals may claim affiliations or express sympathies to radical groups, though this is not the same as engaging in acts of violence in support of a radical ideology. Evidence assembled in databases such as the Extremist Crime Database (Freilich et al., 2014) or Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the

United States Database (Jensen and LaFree, 2016) could be used as the basis for case studies identifying the influence of online communications and offline social relationships and their impact on individuals who committed an act of ideologically motivated violence. Such investigations could enable tests of the relationship between social learning, social control, and competing theories of radicalization in the likelihood of extremist or violent activities in the real world.

Finally, if criminology as a discipline is to have a greater impact on the study of terrorism, more empirical testing is needed with other theories of offending. Though social control and learning theories have potential applicability, for example, others have proposed the use of general strain theory (Agnew, 2010) and situational crime prevention to understand radical violence. There is a range of individual and macro-level theories of crime, with differing degrees of support from qualitative and quantitative investigations. Aspects of each may have some applicability to radical expression, such as impulsivity which is linked with involvement in bullying behaviors on- and offline (Patchin & Hinduja, 2015). The lack of empirical investigation limits our knowledge of the benefits of criminological theories for understanding terrorism and radical violence. Thus the use of existing secondary data sets is essential to improve our knowledge of the use of criminological theories generally.

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Disclosure statement

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Appendix 1. Case Study Template

Name:
Total documents identified:
Provide count of documents by type/category:

(1) Please provide a timeline and overview life-history of the selected individual, from birth until final arrest (e.g., family, work, friends, mental health, military experience, prison) or death (dependent on the outcome of the incident).

(2) General on-line involvement

    (a)   what sites did they have accounts on, or appear to participate in?
    (b)   how many of these sites were part of a radical/extremist ideology?

(3) Emergence of the appearance of radicalization/acceptance of an extremist ideology

    (a)   off-line signs/markers
        (i)   Dates, locations, assessments provided by family, friends?
    (b)   on-line signs/markers
        (i)   Posting behaviors, what sites, dates?

(4) The process of entry into the extremist movement and/or radicalization process

    (a)   What were the sources of their exposure to extremist ideology and what seemed to be most important and why?
        (i)   Was there an initial push into a search for extremist materials or ideology?
            (1)   Negative social interaction with peer group?
            (2)   Negative familial development (divorce, death of parent, etc.)?
            (3)   Individual failure at any pro-social activity (sports, employment, school)?

        (ii)   Was there an initial pull into searching for extremist materials or ideology?
            (1)   Contact with a recruiter
            (2)   Contact with someone else who was interested in extremist ideology

                (a)   Was this individual a friend, family member, or someone else?

(5) What was their peer/collegial involvement like?
(6) Did they socialize frequently with other peers generally?
(7) Was this primarily on- or off-line?
(8) Did they socialize frequently with others who are in extremist movements?
(9) Was this primarily on- or off-line?

    (a) Is the individual strongly attached with their parents/grandparents?
    (b) Is the individual strongly attached with other family members?
    (c) Is the individual married prior to joining an extremist movement/radicalizing?
    (d) Is the individual strongly attached with religious groups or leaders?

        (i) Do the religious groups or leaders share an extremist ideology?

(e) as the individual strongly attached to peers; i.e., do they have a strong peer group?

    (i) Are the preponderance of individuals in this peer group involved in delinquent activities?

        (1) To what extent of seriousness were these activities (i.e. mostly misdemeanors or felonies)?

    (ii) Are any of the individuals in this peer group also interested in extremist ideology?
        (1) on- or off-line?

    (iii) Are any of these individuals in this peer group also involved in extremist activity?
        (1) on- or off-line?

(10) Did their behavior change as a function of exposure to ideological materials on- or off-line?

    (i) Was there a noticeable change in behavior before and after their interest in
    (ii) extremist ideology/materials?

        (1) Off-line
        (2) On-line

    (iii) Was there a noticeable change in behavior before and after their joining of an extremist group/movement (if they did so)?
        (1) Off-line
        (2) On-line

    (iv) Did the actor openly indicate the need to take action or use violence to further their ideology or achieve some goal?
        (1) Off-line
        (2) On-line
        (3) Did they have social media accounts?
        (4) Did they have discussion forum accounts? If so, what/where?